It is interesting to note that this presentation assumes that one can say what the authority requires, whether or not the requirement is justified on the merits. Richard Friedman argues that „if there is no way of knowing whether a statement is authoritative other than by evaluating its content to see whether it merits acceptance as such, then the distinction between an authoritative statement and a rational advice or belief will have collapsed” (Friedman 1973, 132). Such an idea is developed by Raz in one of the main arguments in favor of the „source thesis”, the idea that an adequate test of the existence and content of law must be based solely on social facts and not on moral arguments. (See the entry on legal positivism.) The subjects of authority „can benefit from its decisions only if they can verify their existence and content in a way that does not depend on raising the same issues that the authority must regulate” (Raz 1994, 219). If the law aims to settle disputes on moral issues, then the law must be identifiable without resolving the same disputes. The law is thus exhausted by its sources (such as legislative decrees, court decisions and customs, as well as local conventions of interpretation). This type of reasoning has been generalized (cf. Shapiro 1998), but also criticized. It is unclear what kind of limitation the idea that it should not include „the same subjects” represents – perhaps if morality is a necessary condition, there could be moral tests of authority that leave the relevant dependent reasons intact (Coleman 2001, 126-7). And while law does serve as a blueprint for controlling and evaluating behavior, it can also have other functions, such as educating its subjects about right and wrong, and this may serve poorly the attitude that rules must in part be followed because they are rules (Walukhov 1994). There are many things in life that we feel committed or committed to.

An obligation is a situation where a person has an honourable, inherent or legal obligation to do something. The basic legal definition of the obligation is slightly different and can be described as a binding commitment that obliges those involved to do something or pay for something. However, there are other forms of engagement, including: Sensitivity to these issues led Hart to defend a rules-based theory. He says that while sanctions may mark circumstances in which people are obliged to comply, they have an obligation only if they are subject to a practiced social rule that requires an act or omission. The fact that subjects generally use it marks it as normative. Three other characteristics characterize mandatory provisions: they must be reinforced by serious or persistent pressure to comply with them; They must be considered important for social life or for a valuable aspect of it; and their requirements may conflict with the interests and objectives of the subject (Hart 1994, 85-88). This presentation of the nature of the obligations is not a representation of their validity. Hart does not say that a legal obligation is binding if there is a willingness to exert serious pressure to support them, etc. He believes that an obligation is legally valid if it is part of the legal system (i.e. if it is certified as such by the legal criteria of that system) and that a legal obligation is morally valid only if there are reasonable moral reasons for complying with it. But at least in his early work, he proposes the theory of practice as an explanation of duties in general – legal duties are the creatures of legal rules, moral duties of moral rules, and so on. (Hart later modified this view, see 1982, 255-68; and 1994, 256.) So what are the legal obligations? These are legal requirements that legal entities must comply with.

A mandatory act or omission is something that the law does not make optional. Since people can clearly violate their legal obligations, „non-optional” does not mean they are physically forced to comply, and the law does not leave them without a suitable alternative. On the contrary, people often calculate whether or not they have to fulfill their legal obligations. Could it then be that obligations are simply important reasons, even if they are sometimes neglected or outdated? This cannot be a sufficient condition: high courts have important reasons not to go back too often, but no legal obligation to refrain from doing so. It is also not necessary: you have an obligation, but only a trivial reason, not to walk on someone`s lawn without your consent. Every legal system contains mandatory laws, but there is no decisive linguistic marker that determines what they are. It is not necessary to use the term „obligation” or its term almost synonymous with „duty”. Mood is rarely found imperative. The Canadian Penal Code requires not condoning genocide: „Anyone who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of a criminal offence and may be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.” The English law on the sale of goods states: „If the seller sells goods in a transaction, there is an implied condition that the goods delivered under the contract are of merchantable quality.” The fact that these laws create obligations stems from the way the terms „offence” and „implied condition” operate in their respective jurisdictions, not from the language in which they are expressed. The question of political obligation therefore revolves around the question of whether there are moral reasons for obeying the imperative requirements of an institutionalized, morally fallible and far-reaching authority. This obligation is intended to be comprehensive, since it includes all legal obligations and all those that the law requires to be respected. It is not supposed to bind no matter what, although it is supposed to be a real commitment among others.

Some philosophers also argue that it should bind people in particular to their own state, that is, to the states in which they reside or are citizens, and that an argument that could not demonstrate that one has stricter duties to obey one`s own country than an equally just foreigner would be erroneous to this extent (Simmons 1979, 31–35; Green, 1988, pp. 227-28). Finally, it is common ground that the obligation exists only if a minimum condition of justice is satisfied. This view is expected from both Hobbes and Locke, but its most influential contemporary version is due to Joseph Raz (1977; 1990, 35-84). It argues that the obligations are categorical grounds for action, which are also protected by exclusionary grounds of non-action for some of the competing reasons. Commitments exclude some contrary reasons – usually at least for reasons of expediency and ordinary preference – but they generally do not exclude all of them: a reason for exclusion is not necessarily a conclusive reason.